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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to investigate public
opinion on the Panama Canal treaties as a possible exception,
to the usual apathy of the American people toward foreign
affairs.
A telephone survey was taken in March, 1977» in trie
Williamsburg, Virginia area to determine if public concern
for this foreign policy issue was unusually high.

In

October, 1977> a second survey was taken because the treaty
negotiations had been concluded and the documents submitted
to the Senate for ratification.
It had been hypothesized that this foreign affairs issue
would be salient for the American public because it was seen
as a bread and butter issue.

The results suggested that

there was not a great deal of public interest in the Panama
Canal issue generally, but that among those segments of the
population for whom the issue was salient, opposition to the
canal treaty was based on defense, trade, and the control of
the canal.

v ii

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THE USUAL RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research is to investigate the
relationship between public opinion and the ratification of
the Panama Canal treaties as a possible exception to the
usual relationship between public opinion and foreign policy.
This possibility was raised by the effective use of the
canal treaty proposals by Ronald Reagan in the 1976 primary
campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, and a
long history of congressional opposition to new treaties.
Such an investigation seemed particularly relevant since the
negotiations were at a virtual standstill when the study
was begun and the treaties have now received final
ratification by the Senate.
Public opinion can be described as a set of expressed
beliefs or preferences relating to some policy held by the
people as a whole, or at least a large number of them.

This

opinion becomes of interest to political scientists when the
beliefs or preferences are concerned with the government or
public policy.

2

3

Public opinion is considered to be particularly
important in a democracy because
Popularized versions of democratic theory often
presuppose . . . the "omnicompetent" citizen.
In
particular they have assumed three things about
the voter:
(1 ) that he is attentive to and informed
about the persons and issues in public life, (2 ) that
he accurately perceives the alternative positions
taken by each political party or major faction in
important policy disputes, and (3 ) that he holds
some one of the apparently common versions of
political ideology . . . so that he can assess
political alternatives by referring to his own
ideological predispositions.^
Political scientists have long recognized that the
democratic assumption of a well-informed public capable of
making policy decisions does not coincide with the realities
of American democracy.

In reality, the American public

is generally not very well informed about the public policies
and decisions made on its behalf by elected officials.

In

idealized or popular democratic theory political disinterest
or apathy is not

permitted; in democratic reality it does

• + 2
exist.
The theoretical faith in the interest and participation
of the general public in governmental affairs was seriously
questioned by Walter Lippmann in 1925 in The Phantom Public.
V. 0 . Key concluded,

"Mr. Lippmann demolished whatever illusion

David 0. Sears, "Political Behavior," in The Handbook
of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot
Aronson (Reading, Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1969), p. 32^.
2
Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion,"
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall, 1952), p. 316.

k
existed that *the public' could be regarded as an
omnicompetent and omniscient collectivity equipped to decide
the affairs of state."

Mr. Lippmann made it clear that the

average man had little time for the affairs of state; man's
major concern is his own private well-being.
also recognized

Bernard Berelson

that the voter did not really match this

theoretical description.

He said,

"If the democratic

system

depended solely on the qualifications of the individual voter,
then it seems remarkable that democracies have survived through
A
the centuries."
There have been many studies of public opinion and the
extent of voter knowledge on public issues and they are
almost uniformly pessimistic about the informed involvement
of the average citizen.

In a classic work, American Voter,

Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes report:
Our detailed inquiry into public attitudes
regarding what we took to be the most prominent
political
issues of the time revealed a
substantial lack of familiarity with these
policy questions.
Our measures have shown
the public's understanding of policy issues
to be poorly developed . . . Neither do we find
much evidence of the kind of structured
political thinking that we might expect to
characterize a well-informed electorate.r
5
L. W. Milbraith,

in his study of participation by the

3
-'V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 5«
k

Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Practice and Democratic
Theory," in Public Opinion and Public Policy, ed. by Norman R.
Luttbeg (Homewood, Illinois:
The Dorsey Press, 197^)» P» 20.
5

^Angus Campbell, et. al, American Voter:
An Abridgement
(New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1 9 6 k ), pp. 281-282.

5
electorate, had similar findings.
About one-third of the American adult population
can be characterized as politically apathetic or
passive; in most cases, they are unaware, literally,
of the political part of the world around them.
Another 60 per cent play largely spectator roles
in the political process; they watch, they cheer,
they vote, but they do not do battle.
In the
purest sense of the word, probably only 1 or 2
per cent could be called gladiators.^
Politics appears, then, to be a subject about which
most citizens are rather indifferent.

Cantril, in his

study of things that concern people most, asked Americans
about the nature of their fondest hopes and worst fears.
Political matters were mentioned by 2 per cent as their
"fondest hope" and by 5 per cent as their "worst fear."
The international situation was mentioned by ten per cent
and 24- per cent respectively.

Of much greater importance

to the respondents were their families’ economic and health
situations.

Eetter economic status was most hoped for by
n
65 per cent, better health by 46 per cent.
Thus, from this
study it was clear that personal lives were far more salient
to the average person's thoughts that political matters,
though, of course, the two categories could overlap as, for
example, in the time of war.
In their study of the influence of constituent opinion

^L. W. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965), P* 21.
n
Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Behavior (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), P« 3 6 .

6
on the voting behavior of congressmen, Miller and Stokes
concluded that
. . . most Americans are almost totally uninformed
about legislative issues in Washington.
At best
the average citizen may be said to have some general
ideas about how the country should be run, which
he is able to use in responding to particular
0
questions about what the government ought to do.
The conclusion that the mass public is generally not well
informed, not interested, and not inclined to think very deeply
about government policy issues seems widely agreed upon by
American political scientists. This lack of interest and
information seems to include the field of foreign affairs.
Even though Cantril found more concern with international
affairs than political issues in general, the percentage
expressing such concern was notably small and they probably
had less structured opinions in foreign than in domestic
politics .
Robinson was particularly appalled by the lack of public
interest and information in the field of foreign affairs.
Survey researchers and other social scientists
who have examined the results of typical poll data
have found that the vast majority of citizens hold
pictures of the world that are at best sketchy,
blurred and without detail or at worst so impoverished
as to beggar description.
The restricted horizons
become particularly evident when one examines the
public's inability to give satisfactory answers to
objective questions related to world affairs.^

g
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency
Influence in Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, LVII, Mo. 1
(March, 1963)# p* ^7•
9
'John P. Robinson, Public Information about World Affairs
(Ann Arbor, Michigan!
Institute for Social Research, 1967)» P« 39.

7
In their study of the impact of war costs, public
opinion, and anti-war demonstrations on congressional
voting on Vietnam war bills, Paul Burstein and William
Freudenburg concluded that "the public is not very attentive
to foreign policy questions, and legislators are not likely
to pay much attention to public opinion on issues that are
not salient to the public.
Bernard C. Cohen, in a study of foreign policy-making
and the Japanese peace treaty after World War II, looked at
the relationship between public opinion and policy
formulation, and it is particularly interesting to compare
public reaction to this treaty with present reactions to the
Panama Canal treaties.

He distinguished two ways in which

the public can influence policy-making.

One is by creating

a climate in which policy must be made, an example of which
is the isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's.

The other

method by which the public can influence policy-making is
through the active and articulate expression of opinion on
policy i s s u e s . ^

He concluded that at the time of the

■^Paui Burstein and William Freudenburg, "Ending the
Vietnam War:
The Impact of War Costs, Public Opinion, and
Anti-War Demonstrations on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Bills,"
(Paper presented at the 1976 annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 2-5,
1976), p. 29.
Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign
Policy:
The Making: of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), P« 29-

8
Japanese peace settlement in 1951* "the public was operating
in the first of these:
American opinion on Japan was permissive and
tolerant, giving policy-makers wide latitude in
their search for internationally acceptable
policy substance.
Popular restraints on their
freedom to decide in concrete terms how Japan
should be treated were few.-^
This permissiveness and lack of restraint, after a
bitterly fought and costly war, is further demonstrated by
the fact that 29 per cent of the public had neither heard nor
read anything about the peace treaty and 16 per cent of those
18
who were aware had no opinion on the merits of the document. ^
A fuller sense of the lack of concern and of information
on the part of the American public is conveyed by investigations
which probed the apathy and ignorance of the American people.
In August, 19^5, as the war ended, approximately half of the
population admitted that they had not heard or read anything
about the surrender terms the Allies had presented to Japan
the week before.

At the end of the year, 55 per cent of

the people polled did not have a "fairly clear idea" of what
1A
American policy was towards Japan.
This, then, was the character of American public
opinion on the issues raised by a peace treaty with Japan:
neither interested nor informed, yet quite tolerant of the

~^Ibid . , p . 57 .

^ Ibid ., p . 58 •
l4Ibid., pp. 53-5^

new, more generous approach to Japan.

Apparently the American

citizen's concern with foreign policy vis-a-vis Japan ended
with the war and its direct effect on their personal lives.
A treaty per se lacked the personal relevance seemingly
necessary for informed involvement in international affairs.
In 1962 and 1963 Hazel Gaudet Erskine summarized results
from numerous representative polls on international affairs
for the Public Opinion Quarterly.

These results, again,

reveal a vast lack of knowledge in large segments of the
population.

In questions asked in 19^8, 19^9» and 1953»

^2 per cent of those polled had not heard of the Atlantic
Pact, 55 per* cent had not heard of radio programs that our
country was broadcasting to the Russian people, and 81 per
cent had not heard or read anything about Senator Bricker's
controversial proposed Constitutional amendment to limit
the President's treaty-making powers.

Moreover, in a question

asked in 19^?» slightly more than half of the respondents had
not heard or read anything about the widely publicized
Marshall Plan for European recovery.

This percentage

fluctuated during the next three years, but by February,
1950» 35 per cent of those polled had neither heard nor
read of the Marshall P l a n . ^
Even when an issue does capture the attention of a
large segment of the people,

they may have great difficulty

"^Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Exposure to
International Information," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28,
No. b (1963b), pp. 658-6 5 9 .

in formulating an informed opinion on the subject.

John £.

Mueller, in War, Presidents and Public Opinion, found that
public opinion on many war issues was marked by uncertainty,
indecision and vacillation.

"To deal with this uncertainty

and indecision, many in the population grope for cues on
A

which to base their opinion.

The perceived issue position

of various opinion leaders is very often taken as an
important guide."
obviously,

The most important opinion leader is,

the president, and many "followers" are inclined

to "rally to the support of the president no matter what
he d o e s . " ^

Mueller claims that, because of the follower

phenomenon, there are often major shifts in public opinion
on questions of policy after policy changes have occurred.
For example, the Harris poll reported that support for bombing
the Hanoi-Haiphong area increased in a major way after the
bombing of military targets there was begun in 1966.

"What

this phenomenon means, of course, is that, if one wishes to
assess the American public’s 'opinion* on an issue, it is
essential that consideration be taken of what the administration1
17

policy was at the time the poll question was posed." '
It is obvious from this analysis of American public
opinion on policy, and particularly foreign policy, that as
Robinson argues, a large proportion of the people

16

John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion
(Hew York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973)» P* 6 9 .

^ Ibid., p . 71 •

11

in the United States
see no real continuing connection between their
concerns and the foreign policies and affairs
of the country.
Most people have become well
accustomed to attaching the overwhelming
proportion of their energies and interests to
activities involving their families, their work,
friends, clubs and local civic problems.
They rarely think about political issues because the world
of politics is one towards which they are quite indifferent.
Personal lives are much more salient in the average person’s
thinking than political matters.
It would be inaccurate to conclude from this analysis
that everyone in the mass public is uninformed.

Various’

estimates are given as to the actual size of the "interested”
public, usually ranging from one-third to one-fifth, or even
smaller.

This group is not representative of the general

public but is made up of more highly educated (college or
above), white-collar workers who generally have a higher
socio-economic standing than the public-at-large.

In

addition, this group receives its information about public
issues from a larger variety of sources including those that
are more specialized and analytic. ^

These people are likely

to be the opinion leaders for the majority of the public.
Cohen found that Americans who had been to college
were comparatively well informed on the issues and implications

18

Robinson, Op. cit., p. 51•

^^Ibid., pp. 18-33*

12

of Japanese-American relations and more likely to be
tolerant.

Almond labeled them the ’’attentive public," an

informed and interested stratum before whom elite discussion
and

controversy take place.

function of the

According to Almond, the

attentive public is to subject policy to

informed criticism.20
Amitai Etzioni, in a study of the social-psychological
aspects of international relations also noted the relationship
between increased knowledge and increased public action.

He

looked at elections
. . . as societal actions, as a way in which society
chooses among its elites and among alternative
courses of action . . . In general, citizens with
more education, a better standard of living,
higher social status, more leadership skills and
experience, and key positions in organizations,
have more effect on the societal course than those
who fall lower in these dimensions
A paradox arises in studies of this better informed
and more interested segment of the public.

Rather than come

to independent judgments as one might expect, they actually
tend to be more supportive of official policy than those less
well informed, and their opinions fluctuate to correspond
with changes in official policy.

In his study of public

20

Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy (New York:
Frederick A.Praeger, Publishers, 1950)»
p. 2 2 8 .
21

Amitai Etzioni, "Social-Psychological Aspects of
International Behavior," in The Handbook of Social Psychology,
ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading,
Massachusetts:
Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., I969), p. 57^ •

13
opinion on nuclear weapons tests and fallouts, E. J. Rosi
observed that more of the attentive public appeared to
respond positively and rapidly to the setting of policy
by the administration than was true of the mass public.
For example, in 1961-62 the informed increasingly favored
test resumption, but switched more sharply to the test ban
treaty in 1963 when the administration endorsed it.

22

Sears had similar findings:
There is some evidence that additional information
on foreign policy issues, rather than polarizing
opinion, increases support for official government
policy. . . Higher information levels, as indexed by
amount of factual information, have been associated
with greater support of official policy in several
studies.^
The American public, therefore, has been characterized
by low interest and lack of knowledge in public affairs in
general and foreign policy in particular.

While a large

majority of the people are uninformed and apathetic, there
is a small core group of "attentive" people who are interested
and informed about policy, but this group generally tends to
be supportive rather than critical of administrative action.
There is little evidence that, as a general rule, public
opinion operates to influence the formation of foreign policy.

22

E. J. Rosi, "Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons Tests and Fallout, 195^~1963»" Public Opinion
Quarterly, 29 (1965)» p* 293*
2*^Sears, Op, cit., pp. 351-352.

1A
or works in any significant way to shape or modify such policy
when it is proposed by the government;

it

is more likely to

follow the lead of the policy-makers.
There have been exceptions to the general r u le.

Some

foreign policy issues are apparently more salient for the
American people than the foregoing analysis would indicate.
Although the war in Vietnam did not concern large segments
of the public in its early years, it became more important
as it dragged on. Paul Burstein and William
found that adverse

Freudenburg

public opinion and war demonstrations were

highly correlated with the increasing costs of the war.
Costs, of course, include not only dollars but casualties,
neglected social programs, and political unrest.

"The most

obvious interpretation is that the general public, as well
as the anti-war demonstrators, were extremely sensitive to
the costs of the war; as costs escalated without compensating
benefit, people turned against the war.""

Mueller made a

similar conclusion that public support for wars

(Korea and
PC

Vietnam) declined as the length and costs of the wars grew.
The declining support for the wars was also related to the
casualty rate.

"Every time American casualties increased by

a factor of 10, support for the war dropped by about 15
percentage points.

2k

Burstein, Op. cit., p. 35*

^Mueller, Op. cit., p. 260.
26Ibid.. p. 6 0 .

15
One explanation for the unusual coalescing of reaction
to these wars is that economic costs and higher casualty
rates touched people directly and, thus, were viewed by the
public as personal concerns.

War costs could be considered

a "bread-and-butter" issue which people take personally and
is, therefore, highly salient.

James N. Rosenau theorized

that foreign policy becomes salient for the American public
when those issues can be interpreted as "bread-and-butter"
issues .27
The Panama Canal treaty issue seems to be another
exception to the general rule of public apathy towards foreign
policy issues.

Ronald Reagan focused the public's attention

on the Panama Canal by making it a campaign issue in the 1976
presidential primaries.

As early as August, 1975* he began

attacking President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger for
their negotiations with Panama over a new treaty that would
eventually give the Panamanians control over the canal and
the Canal Zone.

Reagan's criticism reached its peak in 1976

in the Texas primary campaign with his accusation that Ford
was planning to give the Panama Canal to a "tinhorn dictator
friend of Fidel Castro's."

He added,

"Personally, I would

v

tell this jerk we bought it, we paid for it, and we are going
to keep it."

28

Reagan went on to say:

27(James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
(Hew York:
Random House, 1961), pp. 99-100.
28
"Reagan's Startling Texas Landslide," Time, May 10,
1976, p. 10.

16
The Canal Zone is not a colonial
is not a long-term lease.
It is
territory, every bit the same as
the states that were carved from
Purchase.^

possession.
It
sovereign U . S.
Alaska and all
the Louisiana

This rhetoric reflects what many Americans have
learned about the Panama Canal in the classroom as children.
There was little recognition of the fact that the United
States leases the canal from Panama and has powers and rights
as if it were sovereign United States territory.
bought, it was leased in perpetuity.

It was not

Nevertheless, many

Americans are unconvinced by such reasoning.
The fact that a candidate for a major political office
would choose to make treaty negotiations a campaign issue
suggests his belief that this foreign affairs question had
become or could be made salient for Americans.

It could be

argued that Reagan attempted to make the Panama Canal a
public issue as part of his campaign strategy to separate
himself from his opponent.

This may be true; it remains clear

that there was a strong public reaction to this particular
foreign policy issue as measured by polls and press coverage,
and contrary to the usual public apathy over foreign affairs.
President Ford apparently felt that his public support
of the negotiations with Panama could be politically
disadvantageous in an election year and tried to put the issue
to one side until the election was over.

29

Jimmy Carter

Canal Zone:
Political Issue in the U. S., Time Bomb
in Panama," U. S > Nev/s & World Report, April 2.6, 1976, p. 2 k .

17
avoided the issue when possible and made only general
statements when questioned directly about his stand on the
problem.

All of these men believed that the subject of Panama

was a volatile one.

In a television interview in 1976, former

Governor John Connally of Texas said that Reagan's position
on the Panama Canal had been a major factor in his primary
victory there over President Ford.

He said,

To us, the Panama Canal is just across the Gulf
of Mexico.
They're our neighbors, so to speak.
Houston is the third-largest port in the United
States and most of our shipping goes through the
Panama Canal, so there's a real sensitivity to
the control of the Panama Canal in Texas.
Strong public opinion regarding our interest in Panama
is not a new phenomenon.

In 1964, during the disturbances

over a flag-flying incident in the Canal Zone, almost
two-thirds of the Americans questioned indicated they had
been following the dispute.

when further questioned as to

hov/ the United States should solve the problem, 45 per cent
favored a "firm" policy without concessions while only 9
per cent felt that concessions should be made or that the
canal should be given to Panama. 31
It should be noted that in 1964, when 64 per cent of
Americans polled said they had been following the Panama
dispute, 63 per cent of those polled on Vietnam said they

30
^ Richard Hudson, "Storm Over the Canal," New York Times
Magazine , May 16, 1976, p. 18.
•^George H. Gallup, The Gallup Polls Public Opinion 19351971, Vol. Ill (New York:
Random House, 1972)*

18
had given little or no attention to Vietnam.

32

Americans

were not very interested in that war, but they were clearly
interested in Panama.
Further evidence to suggest that Americans have been
atypically aroused by the dispute over the Panama Canal
negotiations may be found in congressional reaction.

A

congressman can frequently cite the number of letters he
has received from constituents to support his position on
a particular issue.

In addition, congressmen will conduct

their own private polls to determine what the public actually
thinks about a number of things.

Although it may be argued

that these polls and letters do not represent the total public
view, it stands to reason that congressmen are affected by
them and their actions will,

therefore, reflect these opinions.

There is some evidence that congressmen frequently do not
correctly perceive the views of the constituents, but Panama
may be the exception to this rule.
Burstein and Freudenburg found that Senators did pay
attention to war costs, public opinion, and demonstrations
when they were considering Vietnam legislation, and that
congressmen believe their stands on issues influence their
electoral chances.

Not all foreign policy issues are salient

to the public, but when an issue is salient, legislators are
not likely to ignore the views of their constituents.^^

-^Mueller, Op. cit., p. 81.
33

Burs tern, Op. cit., pp. 29~30.

19
Congressional opposition to renegotiation of the Panama
Canal treaty in a way that would relinquish American control
over the canal and the Canal Zone has been intense.

In

October, 1975» a sense of Congress resolution was approved
in both the House and the Senate saying

"that the

Administration should protect the vital

interests of the

United States in the Canal Zone and in any new Panama Canal
pact."

In addition,

thirty-seven Senators, led by Senator

Strom Thurmond submitted a resolution to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 1976 "urging retention of undiluted
United States sovereignty over the Canal Z o n e . " ^

Ambassador-

at-large Ellsworth Bunker has stated that the opposition to
the treaty in Congress reflects "to a considerable degree
the sentiments of many citizens and considerable public
education is needed if a new treaty is not to be regarded
as bad politics domestically."
The "follower" phenomenon in foreign policy described
by Mueller also may not seem to apply.to

the canal issue.

If

the follower phenomenon were operative,

presidents would have

been able to lead the American public to accept the newtreaties long before now.

Attempts have been made since

3A

"Controversy over Proposed Panama Canal Treaty
Revision," Congressional Digest, April, 1976, p. 107.
^
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-^Hudson, Op. cit., p. 19*
o

Ellsworth Bunker, "The Panama Canal Negotiations:
Popular Myths and Political Realities," The Department of
State Bulletin, LXII, No. 109^ (December 22, 1975)» P» 8 8 3 *

20
1964 to complete a new treaty with Panama.

Successive

presidents have declared their support for such a treaty,
but adverse public and congressional opinions have consistently
thwarted their attempts to conclude the treaties and have them
ratified by the Senate.

This is being accomplished how, but

only after the adoption of major amendments that protect
American interests and answer the concern of the American
public.
All of these sources seem to indicate that there has
been atypically strong public opposition to relinquishing
control of the Panama Canal to Panama and, moreover, that
this public opinion has been effective in delaying
bi-partisan presidential efforts to have the treaties
accepted by the public and approved by the Senate.

The

public opposition has now resulted in major amendments to
the treaties originally signed and submitted by the president.
This paper will investigate the possibility that the
Panama Canal treaties represent an atypical exception to the
usual relationship between public opinion and foreign policy
and the treaties could be ratified only because the demands
of the American public had been met and the United States'
interest had been protected by. amendments to the original
treaties.

The question is why is Panama such a salient

issue for the American public?

In what way is Panama different

from other areas of foreign policy where the public is
generally disinterested and apathetic?

Rosenau has pointed

out that there is practically no thing known about why one
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situation abroad never becomes the subject of public
discussion, whereas another becomes a cause celebre.

As

Cantril's study indicates, the mass public is much more
concerned with personal issues that with political issues.
One explanation for the interest in Panama is that the people
see it in more personal terms than other foreign policy issues.
But why.?

Certainly Ronald Reagan's assertion that "it is

sovereign U. S. territory, every bit the same as Alaska and
all the states that were carved from the Louisians. Purchase,"
though legally inaccurate, reflects the deep feelings of
possession that Americans have about Panama.

They seem to

agree that "we bought it, we paid for it, and we are going
to keep i t ."
It is clear that there has been strong opposition to
the Panama Canal treaties.

This is particularly puzzling

when this reaction is compared to American apathy toward the
Japanese peace treaty.

Public opposition could be based on

objective, impersonal reasoning to the effect that the United
States control of the canal is essential to the national
defense of the United States and that foreign control of the
canal would pose a threat to national security.

Opposition

could also be of a more subjective, personal nature such as
pride of ownership, or fear that relinquishing control would
"cost" in terms of goods and services and the availability
of products that are shipped through the canal.
The objective arguments seem easily answered.

There is

little reason, either military or economic, not to relinquish
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control of the canal to Panama because neither supertankers
nor the larger aircraft carriers can pass through.

Many of

the new sea vessels must go around the Cape because they will
not fit in the locks of the canal.

This inconvenience has not

noticeably hindered military operations or commercial shipping.
In addition,

the canal is extremely difficult to defend.

New

types of ex plosives can be strategically placed, and, in time
of war, the canal is particularly vulnerable to missile or
submarine attack.

For these reasons,

the Navy no longer

considers use of the canal in planning for emergencies.
Advocates of a new treaty stress that the best defense
of the canal is to give it to the Panamanians, which would
reduce or eliminate the possibility of guerrilla attack.
If the United States retains control, It faces mounting,
bitter hostility in Panama which could eventually lead to the
destruction of the very interest that it wants to preserve.
Accommodating Panama’s aspirations to exercise its
sovereignty over the canal and the Canal Zone is considered
to be "good foreign policy as well as good defense policy if,
through accommodation,
needs .

37

the United States can safeguard its
.

.

Moreover, recognizing Panamanian sovereignty over

the canal would remove a major irritant in the relations
between the United States and Latin America.

■^Richard W. Rastetter,
May 30, 1967, p. 5-

"The Panama Canal," Daily Press,
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Since ratification of the treaties would appear to be
objectively good policy,

the hypothesis of this paper is that

the Panama Canal treaty issue is salient to the American
people because the Panama Canal is subjectively seen as a
very personal issue to most Americans.

They believe that

the canal symbolizes great American technological accomplish
ments and its construction is a part of a romantic era in
the history of our country.

It represents an investment of

American capital and American "know-how" and there is "pride
of ownership."

Many Americans may also believe that commerce

between the east and west coasts would be more costly under
a new treaty and that consumer prices would rise.

It may be

these "bread, butter and pride" issues, in addition to the
impersonal issues of defense and Latin American relations that
determine the saliency of this particular foreign policy Issue
to the American public.
The purpose of this study,

then, is to investigate

whether the Panama Canal treaties do, in fact, represent an
exception to the usual rule about public indifference toward
foreign policy issues and, second,

to discover, if possible,

the basis of this concern.
The relevance of such a study is two-fold.

First, if

a more precise analysis can be made of the public opposition
to the Panama Canal treaties,

this will point to the direction

that any attempts at public reeducation must take.

It may be

that past attempts to persuade the public have failed because
they have not been aimed at overcoming the real reasons for

for the opposition.

Second, such a study may add to the

information already available on the relationship between
public opinion and foreign policy in America and could
eventually contribute to the formulation of a more comprehensive
theory of this relationship.

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
As previously stated,

the purpose of this research was

to investigate the relationship between public opinion and
the Panama Canal treaty ratification.

It has been hypothesized

that Panama, unlike other foreign policy issues, is salient
to the American people.

This saliency is due not only to

reasons of defense or general military needs, but also to
more subjective personal reasons.

These include the fact

that the canal represents a great technological accomplishment
in which Americans justifiably feel great pride and that
Americans see the canal as vital for trade and commerce,
which, when translated into increased prices, becomes a "bread
and butter" issue.
In order to test these hypotheses, it was decided to
survey a number of people on their various views about the
Panama Canal treaties and their interest in the negotiation
of those treaties.

Because particular subgroups--for example,

older people, Republicans,

the less educated, lower income

groups, southerners, and individuals with military background-might be found to oppose increased Panamanian control more
than others, it seemed necessary to use a sample large enough
to insure the adequate representation of these groups.
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The subjects were 201 people, 18 years of age or older,
whose telephone numbers were in the i/tfill-iainsburg, Virginia
telephone directory.

Approximately 500 telephone numbers

were chosen by list sampling procedures in the WilliamsburgJames City County area, including numbers from such outlying
areas as Toano, horge, Grove, and northern Nev/port News.
Every twentieth number from the telephone directory was
selected.

If that number happened to be a business,

the

next residential number following the business number was
chosen.

A total of 556 numbers were actually selected in

this manner.
The numbers were dialed in order; 65 were busy, changed-,
or disconnected when called; there were 95 "no answers."
In nine cases,

there was no one eighteen or older at home

at that time to respond to the questions.

There were 47-

subjects who answered the telephone but refused to respond
to the questionnaire.

The number of subjects who actually

agreed to participate was 236 and, of these, 35 interviews
could not be completed for various reasons.

When 201

interviews had been completed, no further calls were made;
thus, 105 numbers were unused.
The survey was conducted in March, 1977» by fifteen
high school senior girls who were instructed in telephone
survey techniques.

All of the calls were made in the same

week, Monday through Thursday, between 6:30 p.m. and 9 0 0 p.m.
The first adult to answer the telephone was taken as the
subject.

The interviewers introduced themselves by saying,
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"I am taking a public opinion survey for the Government
Department at William and Mary.

I would like to ask you some

questions about issues facing the United States today.”

In

order to assure that all respondents were adults, the question
was asked,

"Are you eighteen years of age or older?"

response was "yes," the interview continued;

If the

if the answer

was "no," the person answering was asked if there was anyone
at home eighteen or older.

All of the survey interviews

followed the same order and every effort was made to complete
every interview once it had begun.
The questions asked in the interview were designed to
determine what opinions the public actually held on Panama
at the time of the survey, why people held these opinions,
and the amount of factual information they had about the
canal.

There were four basic sections to the questionnaire.

Three focused on information specifically related to the
various hypotheses and the fourth was designed to elicit
background information about the subjects.
The first section was concerned with general questions
about important issues facing the United States today and
v/as designed to find out whether foreign affairs generally
and the Panama Canal negotiations in particular were foremost
in the public's mind.

This section began with open-ended

questions which were not considered to be "leading" and moved
towards greater structure until subjects were finally asked
to rank the importance of canal negotiations when compared
with four other foreign policy areas.

The first question
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asked,

"i/Vhat- do you see as the two most important problems

facing the United States today?"
specifically,

The second question asked

"khat about in the area of foreign affairs,

what do you see as the most important problem facing the
United States today?"
foreign policyt

The next question again focused on

"Is there any other foreign affairs problem

that you think is important?"

Such open-ended questions

were used to determine the general degree of the public's
attention to foreign affairs issues as compared to domestic
issues.

Moreover,

it was hoped that the foreign policy

responses would indicate whether the public follows

the

government's lead in determining which foreign affairs issues
are most important.

Finally,

the responses to these questions

were aimed at obtaining information about the importance of
the canal treaty negotiations.
The final two questions in this section listed five
foreign policy issues and asked the respondents to rank them
as to the most important and the second most important.
the exception of Panama,

with

the issues listed were chosen because

of their current coverage in the news and included (1) peace
in the Middle Fast,

(2) relations with the Soviet Union,

(3) human rights throughout the world,

(4) Panama Canal treaty

negotiations, and (5) majority rule in South Africa.

These

questions were obviously designed to get specific information
about the relevance of the treaty negotiations.
The second section of the questionnaire was concerned
with specific questions about the Panama Canal treaty
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negotiations.

They were carefully designed to avoid forcing

the respondent to take a position on the negotiations if
no opinion existed.

Most of these questions gave the respondent

choices of answers to indicate the strength of his opinions
as well.

Two questions were open-ended and were aimed at

probing opinions about the canal.
The first question in this section asked,

"You have

probably heard something about the negotiations between the
United States and Panama over the new Panama Canal treaty.
"Do you agree that a new treaty should be negotiated, disagree,
or haven't you formed an opinion yet?"
even more specific.

The next question was

"One proposal would give Panama greater

control over the canal.

Would you favor or oppose such a

a treaty or haven’t you formed an opinion about this?"

These

questions clearly distinguish between simply renegotiating
and relinquishing control to the Panamanians and were, again,
designed to provide a kind of scale of the "depth of concern"
about the canal negotiations.

The third question in this

section was intended to measure the strength of the opinion
held.

"How strongly do you (favor)

(oppose) giving Panama

greater control over the canal--very strongly, strongly,
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?"
The next tv/o questions were aimed at determining
opinion on the direct effect of Panamanian control of the
canal on the United States, and asked,

"Do you feel that

if Panama were given greater control over the canal it would
have any effect on the United States directly?"

This question
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was followed by an open-ended question asking for an expla
nation of the response given in the previous question.

"In

what way do you think it would affect the United States?"
This question was included specifically to get information
on the reasons for the saliency of the treaty issue to the
people.
The next question was aimed at the possibility that
saliency was based on defense.

A statement was read:

"American control of the canal is necessary for the defense
of the United States," and the respondent was asked to agree
or disagree.

The strength of the response was measured in

the next question by asking how strongly they agreed or
disagreed that the canal was necessary for defense.

This was

followed by an open-ended question asking why they felt that
control of the canal was or was not necessary for defense.
The final question in this section was, again,
designed to assess the strength of the opinions held about
the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States,
"would you favor using United States'troops to keep control
of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion about
this yet?"

Obviously, subjects willing to commit troops to

the maintenance of control over the canal must have very
strong feelings about the importance of the canal to the
United Sta tes.
In the third section of the questionnaire, specific
questions were asked which were designed to determine the
amount of factual knowledge about the canal held by the

31
respondents in order to test the hypothesis that more know
ledgeable subjects would be more likely to favor renegotiation
of the treaty.

"Do you happen to remember the name of the

United States president who was responsible for negotiating
the original Panama Canal treaty?"
the canal is rather unclear.

"The present status of

Do you happen to remember

whether the United States owns or leases the canal or a ren’t
you sure?"

The last question in this section was open-ended,

"Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal in
school.

What' sticks in your mind most about the canal?"

This question was another attempt to get at the reasons for
the saliency of the Panama Canal issue from the subjects
themselves without the potential biasing effects of asking:
for "yes" or "no" answers to specific questions about the
canal.
The final section of the questionnaire asked personal
information questions of the respondents including age,
education, home state, military experience, religion, party
preference, race, income, and sex.

These questions were

asked for the purpose of subgrouping subjects to test the
various hypotheses having to do with group differences.
Follow-up Survey
As will be seen below,

the results of the survey showed

surprisingly little interest in the treaties among the subjects
in this sample.

However, significant developments in the

treaty negotiations in the months immediately following
the first survey, culminating in the formal signing of the
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treaties by President Carter and General Omar Torrijos amidst
great fanfare and publicity, suggested the possibility of
heightened interest.
nationally.

Certainly this seemed to be the case

Therefore, a second survey was conducted to

determine if significant changes had occurred in public opinion
and if the president had been able to lead the public to follow
his opinions.
The subjects of the second survey were as many of those
who had been .interviewed in the first survey as were still
accessible.

The interviews were conducted in October, 1977*

again using high school senior girls who were instructed in
telephone survey techniques.

All of the calls were made in

the same week, Monday through Wednesday, between 6:30 p.m.
and 9 :30 p.m.

Of the 201 originally questioned,

there were

70 disconnected phones, changed numbers or the respondent
was not available, 26 refused to answer or only partially
completed the second interview,

10 did not answer the phone;

and 95 subjects actually completed the follow-up survey.
To begin the survey,
themselves and said,

the interviewers introduced

"I am taking a public opinion survey

for the Government Department at William and Mary.

I called

this number last March to ask some questions about issues
facing the United States today."

Because names had not been

given by the respondents in the original survey,

the person

on the phone had to be asked if he or she was the person
interviewed in March.

If the person on the phone was the

same sex as the original respondent,

the question was simply
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asked,

"Are you the person I talked to at that time?"

If

the new respondent was the opposite sex, the question was,
"Is the person that I talked with there?"

If confusion

existed about who the first respondent might have been, other
biographical data from the first survey was used, such as
age or party affiliation.
The second survey followed the form of the original
one with only slightly different wording of two questions
to accommodate the changes in events.
question,

For example,

the

"You have probably heard something about the

negotiations between the United States and Panama over the
new Panama Canal treaty.

Do you agree that a new treaty

should be negotiated, disagree, or haven't you formed an
opinion yet?", had to be reworded.

The new question was,

"You have probably heard something about the proposed treaties
between the United States and Panama.

Do you agree that the

new treaties should be approved, disagree, or haven't you
formed an opinion yet?"

When no changes were necessary,

the exact wording of the original questionnaire was used.
The first three sections of the first survey were used in
their entirety with only the slight changes mentioned.
The fourth section, asking for biographical information, was
not repeated since the same respondents were being interviewed.
Two additional questions were added to the new survey
to determine sources of influence on the opinions held by
the subjects, particularly in those cases where the attitudes
had changed.

The first question was designed to determine
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what individual person had most influenced the subject.
"how, thinking about what should be done about the canal today,
what public official or private individual would you say has
most influenced your views about the treaties?"

The final

question asked,"From what source have you received most of
your information about the Panama Canal in recent months?"

CHAPTER III
FINDINGS
The results of the first section of this study show
that at the time this survey was taken neither foreign policy
issues in general nor the Panama Canal treaty negotiations
in particular were considered among the major problems
facing the country by this group of subjects.

As may be

seen in Table 1, only 6 per cent of the sample mentioned
foreign affairs as the most important problem facing the
United States today.

Of far greater concern were problems

with the economy (33*8 per cent), energy (15*9 per cent)
and unemployment (10.0 per cent).
with the economy are combined,
cent of the sample.

If unemployment and concerns

the total reaches 43.8 per

The Panama Canal was not mentioned by

any subject as the most important problem facing the United
States today.
When questioned about the second most important
problem facing the United States, there is a slightly
increased concern for foreign affairs.

As seen in Table 2,

13*9 per cent saw foreign affairs as a second most important
problem facing the United States.

However, nearly one-third

of the sample was not sure or could not even think of a
second problem, and no one mentioned the Panama Canal treaty
negotiations in this question either.
35
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When asked specifically about foreign affairs problems,
one out of four was not able to name one.

Communism was

mentioned by 15*4 per cent and the Middle Sast/Oil by 12.4
per cent.

Other responses ranged from Africa to peace and

morality, but each received only a very small percentage of
the total response.

Only one respondent mentioned the

Panama Canal as the most important problem.
Six out of ten persons interviewed could not think of
a second foreign policy issue that they considered to be
important.

Those who could responded with communism, Africa,

the Middle East, foreign aid, arms control and peace and
morality.

No category other than "not sure" was cited by

more than 8 per cent of the respondents .
Subjects were more responsive when asked to rank
foreign policy issues rather than name them.

A list of

five problems was read and subjects were asked which was the
most important and the second most important.

As seen in

Table 5» one third of the respondents chose human rights
throughout the world as the most important problem.

The

Panama Canal treaty negotiations were mentioned by only 3*5
per cent.
When asked to rank the second most important problem,
the responses in order of frequency were the Middle East,
the Soviet Union, South Africa, human rights and the Panama
Canal.

Only 6.0 per cent chose Panama Canal treaty negotiations.
The results of the second section of the questionnaire,

which is concerned specifically with the Panama Canal treaty
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negotiations, show that at the time the survey was taken,
half of those questioned were riot sure whether a new treaty
should be negotiated.

As can be seen in Table 7> 36.8 per

cent favored a new treaty while only 14.4 per cent were
opposed.

The results were quite different when the subjects

were questioned specifically about a treaty that would give
Panama greater control over the canal.

Table 8 indicates

that now only one-third were not sure; 34.8 per cent opposed
such a treaty and only 28.4 per cent favored it.
The subjects were then asked to assess the strength of
their opinions about a treaty giving Panama greater control
over the canal.

Those who opposed such a treaty tended to

hold stronger opinions than those who favored such a treaty,
but the difference did not reach statistical significance.
As seen in Table 9» almost two-thirds of the respodents, when questioned about the effect-on the United States
if Panama were given greater control over the canal, felt
that it would have an influence on the United States while
only 19*9 per cent felt that it would have no direct effect.
Those who felt it would affect the United States were then
questioned further on just what the effect would be.

Table

10 indicates that nearly one-half of the subjects were not
sure; 18.4 per cent felt that the United States rights to
the canal generally would be denied; 19*9 per cent thought
that United States trade would be hindered; and 10.8 per cent
feared that it would impede defense.
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T A B L E

1

Most Important Problem Facing U. S.

Total

Response

68
12
32
20
23
27
19

Economy
Foreign Affairs
Energy
Unemployment
Morality
Other
Not Sure

T A B

L E

7°.
33-8
6.0
15.9
10 .0
11.4
13.5
9.5

2

Second Important Problem Facing the UN

Response
Economy
Foreign Affairs
Energy
Unemployment
Morality
0 ther
Not Sure

Total
30
28
13
18
13
36
63

IE. 9
13.9
6.5
9.0
6.5
18.0
31.3
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T A B L E

3

ivios t Impo r tan t Foreign Affairs Problem

To tal

Response
Communism
Africa
middle East/Oil
Foreign Aid, General
Arms Control
Peace/morali ty
Foreign Affairs, General
Other
No t Sure

T A B L E

31
13
25
12
13
26
19
10
50

...

F-,

15.4
7.5
12.4
6.0
6 .5
12.9
9-5
5.0
24.9

4

Second Important Foreign Affairs Problem

Response
Communism
Africa
Middle E as t/0 i1
Foreign Aid/General
Arms Control
Peace/Morality
Foreign Affairs/General
Other
Not Sure

To tal
13
9
13
3
12
13
16
3
119

7°6.5
4.5
6.5
1.5
6 .0
6.5
8.0
1.5
59.2
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T A B L E

5

Major Foreign Affairs Problem
First Choice

Total

Problem
Peace in the Middle East
Relations with the Soviet union
xiuman Rights Throughout World.
Panama Canal Treaty. Negotiations
Majority Rule in South Africa
Not Sure

T A B L E

48
52
68
?
18
8

%
23*9
25*9
33-8
3*5
9*0
4.0

6

Major Foreign Affairs Problem
Second Choice

Problem
Peace in the Middle East
Relations with the Soviet Union
Human Rights Throughout World
Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations
Majority Rule in South Africa
Not Sure

To tal
63
46
31
12
32
17

.

.

% .

31.3
22.9
15.4
6.0
15.9
8.5
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T A B L E

7

Should Treaty Be Renegotiated

Response

To tal

Agree
Disagree
Not Sure

74
29
98

T A B L E

.

_

36.8
14.4
48.8

8

Should Panama have Greater Control

Response

Total

Agree
Pisagree
Not Sure

57
70
74

T A B

L E

..... .

28.4
34.8
36.8

9

. Panamanian Control Affect

Response

To tal

Yes
No
Not Sure

127
40
34

%
63.2
19.9
16.9
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As seen in Table 9, almost two-thirds of the respondents,
when questioned about the effect on the United States if
Panama were given greater control over the canal, felt that
it would have an influence on the United States while only
19*9 per cent felt it would have no direct effect.

Those

who felt it would affect the United States were then questioned
further on just what the effect would be.

Table 10 indicates

that nearly one-half of the subjects were not sure; 18.4
per cent felt that the United States' rights to the canal
generally would be denied; 19-9 per cent thought that United
States trade would be hindered; and 10.8 per cent feared that
it would impede defense.
In the next question, a statement was read:

"American

control, of the canal is necessary for the defense of the
United States," and subjects were then asked to agree or
disagree.

Table 11 indicates that over half of the subjects

believed that the canal was necessary for defense while onethird did not; 10 per cent were not sure.

The subjects were

asked to assess the strength of their opinions on this question
and those who agreed held significantly stronger opinions
than those who disagreed (F=1 5 .8 8 ; p < .01).
The question about the value of the canal to the United
States elicited a variety of responses.

Fears were expressed

that the communists might take it over,

that Castro wants it,

that it is necessary for naval operations and that control is
essential in wartime.
"Defense, General."

Such responses were categorized as
Others expressed feelings that the canal

lo

T A B L E

10

How would Panamanian Control
Affect the U. S.
Affect

Total

Trade
Defens e
U. S. Rights to Canal
Panama Unable to Control
Other
Not Sure

40
20
37
7
9
88

TABLE

71
19-9
10.0
18.4
3-5
4.5
43 .8

11

Is Canal.Necessary for Defense
Response

Total

Agree
Disagree
Not Sure

114
67
20

T A B L E

56.7
33*3
,10.0

12

why is Canal Necessary or Unnecessary
Response
Trade
Defense, General
U . S . Rights
Panama Can't Control
Not Necessary - Defense
Necessary - Unspecified
Other
Not Sure

Total
15
45
9
3
40
10
9
70

/°
7.5
22 .4
4.5
1.5
19-9
5-0
4.5
34.8

is obsolete and not needed for defense because large ships
cannot go through, that it is no longer strategic for the
United States, that technologically the United States can
do without the canal.

These responses were categorized as

"Not Necessary - Defense."

Other subjects expressed concern

for trade, for an unspecified need for the canal or for the
rights of the United States generally.

Table 12 indicates

that over one-third of the subjects were not sure why they
held a particular opinion; 22.^ per cent expressed feelings
that, in general, the canal was indispensable for the defense
of the United States; 19*9 percent felt that the canal was
not needed for defense.

Others expressed concerns about

trade and Panama's ability to handle the operation of the
canal.
Table 13 shows the willingness of these subjects to
use troops to keep control of the canal.

While a majority of

those who had decided were not willing, the large "not sure"
percentage suggests that in this sample subjects are far from
unalterably opposed to such a step.

T A B L E

13

Should Troops Be Used to Control Canal

Response_____ To tal
Yes
No
Not Sure

59
79
63

29
39-3
31.3

^5
The results of the third section of the questionnaire,
which was designed to determine the amount of factual knowledge
about the canal held by the respondents, shew that at the time
of the study, most respondents did not know which United
States president had negotiated the original Panama canal
treaty.

As 'Table 14 demonstrates, slightly over one-third of

the subjects could correctly identify President Theodore
Roosevelt.

The others were either incorrect or unsure.

However, as Table 15 indicates, 47-3 per cent of the subjects
correctly answered that the United States leases the canal
while only 15*9 per cent thought it was owned by the United
States.

Again, nearly one-third were unsure.

The subjects

were then asked what they remembered studying about the canal
in school.

As can be seen in Table 16, a variety of responses

to this question were received.

The fact that the building

of the canal was a great engineering feat was mentioned by
22.9 per cent while 14.4 per cent remembered that a cure for
yellow fever was discovered during the construction of the
canal.

The treaty and the way it was

"illegally" obtained

was mentioned by 6.5 per cent and the fact that the canal
was a much needed east-west passage for trade was mentioned
by 12.4 per cent; 34.8 per cent of the subjects either did
not remember anything or did not respond to the question.
In order to determine whether there were any differences
among the various sub-groups in response to questionnaire
items,

total frequencies were subdivided for each sub-group

category--age, education, military experience, religion,
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T A B L E

14

President Responsible for Treaty
Response______ To tal______
Roosevelt
Wrong/Unsure

77
124

T A B L E

3.8*3
61.7

15

Status of Canal
Respons e
Owns
Leases
Not Sure

To tal

__ P..
15-9
47.3
36.6

32
95
74

T A B L E

16

What is Remembered About Canal
Response
Engineering Feat
Treaty
Disease
Trade/East-West Passage
Other
Not Sure

Total
46
13
29
25
18
70

C-'
L.
22.9
6.5
14.4
12.4
9.0
34.8
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political party, income and sex.

The resulting contingency

tables were tested for significance using chi square.
Age was significantly tied to responses to a number of
survey items.

For the identification of the second most

important problem facing the United States,

there was a

significant (p<.01) relationship between age and the problem
chosen.

Younger respondents were more likely to see the

environment, civil rights, and foreign affairs as the most
important issues while older respondents viewed the economy
and unemployment as the most important.
There were no significant differences among sub-groups
in response to the question asking what they saw as the most
important problem in foreign affairs.

However, when foreign

affairs issues were listed and the subjects were asked to
rank them in terms of most important and second most important,
there was a significant (p{. 0 5 ) relationship between the most
important issue and age.

Younger respondents

(18-29) were

more likely to see human rights throughout the world as the
most important problem (42.9 per cent), while older groups
saw the Middle East and relations with the Soviet Union as
more important.
There was also a significant (p{.01) relationship between
age and the subjects ranking of the second most important
problem facing the United States today.

Younger respondents

(18-49) saw the Middle East as the second most important
problem;

the oldest group (over 7°) saw the Panama Canal

(21.4 per cent) and relations with the Soviet Union (21.4
per cent).

Of the respondents who chose the Panama Canal
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treaty negotiations,

33-3 per cent were 60-69*

Almost half

of the 50-59 age group chose human rights in answer to this
ques tion.
Age was also significantly (p^.Ol) related to willingness
to yield greater control to Panama.

Older subjects were

much less willing to relinquish power over the canal than
younger subjects.

Of the age group 60-69» almost two-thirds

opposed such a move; of the subjects over 7 0 , slightly more
than half opposed.

On the other hand, subjects 30-39 generally

favored giving Panama greater freedom to operate the canal.
The age of the subjects was significantly (pf. 0 5 )
related to how they felt about the necessity of the canal
for national defense.

The older the respondents the more

they agreed that the canal is essential for defense.

Among

respondents 60-69» eight out of ten felt it was necessary
and almost all of those over 70 agreed.

On the other hand,

younger respondents were more likely to feel that it was
not needed.

Respondents 18-29 were split half and half over

this issue.
The willingness of subjects to use troops to control
the canal also varied with age (p^.001).

Younger respondents

were much less willing to use troops than older subjects.
Among the 18-29 age group, over half were opposed to the use
of troops, 14.3 per cent favored using troops, and about
one-third were unsure.

however, among respondents 60-69,

over half favored using troops to retain control of the canal
while 22.7 per cent were opposed to such a move and 22.7 per
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cent were unsure about t.he question.
Age of subjects related significantly (p<.05) to
identifying the present status of the canal.

Older

respondents were more likely to be unsure of the present
status while younger respondents were more likely to know
that the canal is leased.

Of the respondents over 70,

about half were unsure of the status, 23*5 per cent said it
was owned and 23*5 per cent said it was leased.

Among those

60-69» 36.4 per cent said it was owned, 31*8 per cent said
it was leased and J1.8 per cent were unsure.

Among respondents

30-3 9 , six out of ten correctly answered that it was leased,
12.9 per cent said it was owned, and one-fourth were unsure.
The educational level of subjects was related to a
number of the survey items.

There was a significant (p^. 0 5 )

relationship between education and the ranking of important
foreign affairs issues.

Majority rule in South Africa was

seen as the most important problem by 42.9 per cent of the
respondents with a grade school education.

Human rights

throughout the world was chosen by one-half of the subjects
with a grade school education and by one-third of those with
high school education.

Both the respondents with college

education and post graduates were more likely to see the
Soviet Union as the most important problem.

Education also

varied significantly (p<.0 5 ) with the willingness of the
subjects to renegotiate the treaty.

As the education level

increased, subjects were more willing to renegotiate the
treaty and more willing to give Panama greater control

over the canal.
There was also a significant (p<. 01) relationship
between education level and feelings about the effect of
Panamanian control of the canal on the Unted States.

The

higher the level of education, the more likely the subject
was to feel that Panamanian control would affect the United
States adversely.
Views on the defense question varied with education
(p <. 001) . Among subjects with a grade school education,
per cent thought the canal was necessary for defense.
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On

the other hand, among college graduates, 58.3 per cent felt
the canal was not essential while 37*5 per cent felt it was.
Among those who had completed high school, 61.4 per cent
felt the canal was needed and 20.5 per cent felt it was not.
Interestingly,

"post-graduates" were more likely to see the

canal as necessary for defense than college graduates with
60 per cent feeling it was essential and 40 per cent feeling
it was not.
The responses to the question asking why the subject
did or did not feel

the canal was essential for defense

related significantly (p^.Ol) to the level of education.
Among the grade school respondents there was a tendency to
feel that the canal was needed for naval strength and other
defense matters while subjects who v/ere college graduates
believed the canal was not necessary because they saw it as
obsolete,

too small, or not strategic.

Only 32.4 per cent o

these subjects felt the canal was essential to defend the

United States through naval operations.
The education level of the subject was also related
(p<.01) to the question of troop use.
of education,
use of troops.

The higher the level

the less likely the respondent was to favor the
Among college graduates, 56-3 per cent were

opposed to the use of troops while 18.8 per cent favored such
a move.

On the other hand, among high school graduates, 29*5

per cent were opposed to the use of troops and 40.9 per cent
favored the use of troops to keep control of the canal.
Not

surprisingly, education was highly related (p\.001)

with the identification of the United States president
responsible for the first treaty.

The higher the education,

the more likely the subject was to name correctly the presiden
Predictably, education also related significantly (p<,001) to
the correct identification of the status of the canal.

Those

with less education were more likely to be unsure of the
status while those with higher education

were more likely

to correctly say it was leased.
Military experience was another factor which seemed to
play a role in influencing opinions on these issues.

The

respondents who had been in the military or whose father had
been in the military were more likely (p<(. 0 5 ) to see foreign
affairs as a major problem facing the United States.

Among

the respondents with no military experience, other problems
such as the environment and civil rights
be listed.

were more likely to

All of the subjects that cijose the Panama Canal

treaty negotiations had either served in the military in the

/ V 3 R ary ;
(\Mlll'iom & ^ at
college

^
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past or were married to someone who had served in the military.
Past military experience also showed a significant
relationship (p<.0 5 ) with willingness to renegotiate the
canal treaty.

Of the respondents opposed to such negotiations,

33*3 per cent had had past military experience themselves;
25 per cent had a spouse with past military experience; only
8.3 per cent had no military experience.
There was a significant (p<.01) relationship between
present military connections and willingness to give Panama
greater control.

Of those who favored giving greater control,

82.5 per cent had no military connections and only 17*5 per
cent were either in the military themselves or had a relative
in the military.

Those with a military connection were much

more likely to have formed an opinion on this question.

Of

the respondents v/ith no opinion, only 2.8 per cent had military
connections and 97*2 per cent had no military connections.
Among subjects with military connections, 40 per cent favored
giving Panama greater control while 52 per cent were opposed.
The question of how Panamanian control would affect the
United States related significantly to both present military
connections

(p^. 05 ) and past military experience (p<. 0 5 ).

Among respondents with present military connections, two-thirds
felt that there would be an effect on the United States and
none of the respondents in this sub-group were unsure of how
they felt.

The respondents with past military experience

showed similar opinions.
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There was a significant (p<.05) relationship between
present military connections

(either self or relatives) and

views on the defense question.

Of the subjects with present

military connections, 80 per cent felt that the canal was
necessary for defense while only 20 per cent felt it was
not.

Again, none of these subjects were unsure of their

opinion on this question.

Among respondents with no military

connection, 53*^ per cent felt the canal was necessary for
defense and 35*2 per cent felt it was not; 11.4 per cent were
unsure.
Respondents with military connections were also more
likely 0p<. 05) to remember studying that the canal is an
important Atlantic-Pacific passage while those with no present
military connection remembered that the building was a great
engineering accomplishment.
Somewhat surprisingly, religious preferences related to
opinions in the survey.

For example, Catholics were more

likely (p<.01) than other respondents to favor a new treaty
while Protestants- were generally opposed.
Religion was also significantly (p^. 05) related to
the opinions about the effect of Panamanian control of the
canal on the United States.

Protestants were more 1 ike ly to

feel that it would affect the United States than Catholics.
Religious preference also related significantly (p<.05) to
the defense question.

Of the subjects who felt that control

of the canal was necessary for the defense of the United States,
71.9 per cent were Protestant, 6.1 per cent were Catholic,

5^

?.9 per cent were Jewish or other, and 14.0 per cent had no
religious preference.

Protestants were the group most willing

(p<. 01) to use troops to defend the canal.

Among Protestants,

36.4 per cent favored the use of troops, 28.7 per cent opposed
and 3^*9 per cent were unsure.

On the other hand, among

Catholics 57*1 per cent opposed using troops, 23*8 per cent
approved, and 19*0 per cent were unsure.
Opinions in this survey were not frequently split along
partisan lines.

however,

the relationship between party and

the choice of a most important foreign affairs issue was
significant (pc. 01).

Of the subjects who chose the Panama

Canal as the most important problem, 71*^ per cent were
Republican and 26.6 per cent were Independent; no Democrats
listed this problem as a major one.

Of the subjects that

chose majority rule in South Africa as the most important
problem, 55*8 were Democrats.

Among the total respondents

who were Democrats, 41.7 per cent chose human rights through
out the world as the most important problem and 20 per cent
chose the middle East.

The Republican respondents were

divided in their choices; 26.8 per cent saw the Middle East;
as the most important, 24.4 per cent saw the Soviet Union and
24.4 per cent picked human rights.
There were also significant (p<6 01) party differences
in response to the question regarding the importance of the
Panama Canal for defense.

Among Republicans 58.6 per cent

believed that the canal was necessary for naval operations
and defense needs in general while only I7.2 per cent felt it
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was not needed or strategic any longer.

Among Democrats,

37.8 per cent felt the canal was necessary for naval
operations while 30 per cent felt it was needed but did not
specify why; 35*1 per cent believed the canal was no longer
essential for defense because it was obsolete, too small,
not strategic, or not a main access route to the United States.
Among Independents, 5° per cent felt the canal was no longer
needed for the various reasons listed above.
Income related significantly (p<. 01) only to the effect
of Panamanian control of the canal on the United States.
The higher his income, the more likely the respondent was
to think it would affect the United States adversely.
Sex differences appeared (p<. 01) on the choice of the
second most important foreign affairs problem.

Of the

respondents who chose Panama in this category, two-thirds
were female and one-third were male.

These results were

reversed among those who chose South Africa:
were male and 37*5 per cent were female.
males

62.5 per cent

The majority of

(51*6 per cent) chose the Middle East as the second

most important problem while a majority of females picked the
Soviet Union as the second most important problem.
More important in this study is the finding of a
relationship between sex and willingness to renegotiate
the treaty (p<.001) and between sex and the willingness to
give Panama greater control over the canal.

Of those who

agreed that the treaty should be renegotiated,
were male and one-third were female.

two-thirds

Women (67 per cent)
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were far more likely than men (28 per cent) to be unsure of
how they felt.

Men were also more willing to give Panama

greater control over the canal than women.

Among those

favoring such a step, six in ten were male.
Sex differences are again significant (p<.01) with
regard to how Panamanian control would affect the United
States.

Among male respondents, ?0.1 per cent thought that

it would affect the United States and 23-0 per cent thought
it would not.

Only 6.9 per cent of the males were unsure.

On the other hand, 22.9 per cent of the females were unsure
while 59*6 per cent felt that it would have a direct effect
on the United States.
The sex of the subject was also related (p<. 01) to
opinions on the troops question.

Again, females were much

more likely to be unsure of their opinion than were men.
Of those subjects who were not sure, 29 per cent were male
and 71 per cent were female.

Among females, 25*7 per cent

favored the use of troops, 33*9 per cent opposed and 40.4
per cent were unsure.

Among males, 33*7 per cent favored using

troops, 46.1 per cent opposed and 20.2 per cent were unsure.
Males were more likely (p<.01) to correctly identify
Roosevelt as the president associated with building the canalsuggesting that they had more factual knowledge about its
history.
Survey II Results
The

sampling procedures used in the second survey

raise questions concerning the legitimacy of comparing
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directly the results of the two surveys to assess changes
over time.

A safer technique would be to compare results

using only the answers of those 95 subjects completing both
interviews.

This has the disadvantage, however, of only

utilizing half the original survey data.
While the second survey subjects cannot be considered
a random sample, it does not necessarily follow that it is
a non-representative sample.

If it can be shown that the

second sample is not systematically different from the first
in terms of demographic variables or in the subjects* opinions
on the items, then no bias should result in comparing the
second survey subjects with the total sample in the first
survey.

Moreover, such a comparison has the advantage of

utilising all the data.
Comparisons of the two samples on the demographic
variables show no major differences.

For example, there

were 44.9 per cent males in the first survey and 47.9 per
cent in the second.

For income, 5^*5 per cent earned $20,000

or less in the first survey and 55*5 per cent were in that
category in the follow-up survey.

In the first survey,

64.5 per cent were Protestant and 10.5 per cent Catholic.
In the follow-up, the comparable figures were 63.8 per cent
and 11.7 per cent.

Among the original subjects, 15*3 per

cent had military experience compared to 15*0 per cent in
the second survey.

In the first survey, 12.4 per cent of

the subjects were presently in the military compared to 11.7
per cent in the second.

With respect to education, 57 per
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of the original group had more than a high school education
compared to 59.6 per cent in the follow-up.

Finally, 68.7

per cent of the original sample was below 49 years of age
compared to 67.8 per cent in the follow-up.
A second kind of check on the representativeness of
the follow-up group was to compare their answers to several
of the questions on the first survey to those of the total
group in the first survey.

In answer to the question on

renegotiating the treaties, 3 6 . 8 per cent of the total
group approved while 14.4 per cent disapproved.

In the follow-

up sample, 41.5 per cent approved and 17 per cent disapproved.
In the total sample 56.6 per cent felt that the Panama
Canal was necessary for defense while 33*3 per cent did not.
The comparable follow-up figures were 53 per cent and 38
per cent.

With regard to the possible use of troops to

defend the canal, 2 9 •

per cent of the original sample

favored such a step compared to almost identical 29-8 per
cent of the second survey group.
Since these comparisons uniformly suggest that the
follow-up subjects do not differ systematically from the
total sample, it seemed reasonable to compare the second
survey responses to those of the total sample on the first
survey,

thereby making use of all of the data.

The results of the second survey indicate that
although the number of people expressing a concern about
foreign affairs tripled between March and October, 1977»
the major concern of the largest number of people remained
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the economy and energy.

The percentage of

people naming a

foreign affairs issue as

the major problem

facing the United

States today in response

to the first question on the survey

increased from 6 per cent to 18.2 per cent
survey, as can be seen in Table 17.

on the second

The Panama Canal was

specifically mentioned by 10.5 per cent as the most important
problem.

No subject mentioned Panama as a response to this

question in the first survey.
There was a substantial number of "Panama" responses
in the entire first section of the second survey.

These

open-ended questions about problems facing the United States
today were designed to allow voluntary responses to determine
the degree of concern about foreign affairs in general and
Panama specifically.

There was

a total of 37 "Panama Canal"

responses to these four questions.

In the first survey,

there had only been three such responses.
When asked what they saw as the most important problem
facing the United States today, one out of four mentioned
the economy while 18.2 per cent mentioned foreign affairs.
Those mentioning morality decreased from 12.7 per cent to
per cent while the percentage mentioning unemployment
or energy did not change significantly.
In response to the question about the second most
important problem facing the United States today, there was
again an increase in the percentage naming a foreign affairs
issue although only four respondents specifically named
Panama.

Those who viewed the economy as the second most
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important problem decreased from 22.1 per cent to 15*2 per
cent while those seeing foreign affairs as a significant
problem rose from 20.6 per cent to 24.2 per cent, as indicated
in Table 18.
The third question in this survey asked the respondent
specifically about the most important foreign affairs problem
the United States has today.

Table 19 indicates that the

most frequent response to this question was "Kiddle East or
Oil."

The second most frequent response was "the Panama

Canal," with one in five believing this to be the most
important foreign affairs problem facing the United States.
Concern over communism and Africa were down as was peace and
morality.
Panama was again mentioned by 25 per cent of those
responding to the question about the second most important
foreign affairs problem.

Middle East/Oil and Africa were

the second most frequent responses with each being given by
about 19 per cent of the respondents.

These results are

shown in Table 20.
i/tfhen the five foreign affairs problems were listed and
the respondent was asked to choose the most important, the
choices in descending order were the Middle East, human rights,
Panama Canal, Soviet Union and South Africa.

Those choosing

the Panama Canal as the most important problem rose from
3.5 per cent to 16.8 per cent.
of response to each issue.

Table 21 shows the percentage
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T A B L E

Most Important Problem Facing U. S
Problem

Total

Economy
Foreign Affairs
Energy
Unemployment
Morality
Panama
Other

22
16
17
11
3
10
19

T A B L E

%*
25-0
18.2
19.3
12.5
3.^
10. *5
21.6

18

Second Important Problem Facing- the U. S
Problem

Total

Economy
Foreign Affairs
Energy
Unemployment
Morality
Panama
Other

10
16
9
11
2
4
18

%*
15.2
24.2
13 .6
16.7
3.0
6.0
27.3

T A B L E

1 9
Most Important Foreign Affairs Problem
Problem
Communism
Africa
Mid East/Oil
Arms Control
Peace/Morality
Foreign Affairs, General
Panama Canal
Other

Total
8
4
20
9
6
16
14
7

11.4
5.7
28.6
12.9
8.6
22 .9
20.0
10.0

*The total is greater than 100% because Panama is included
in the Foreign Affairs category.

T A B L E

20

Second Important Foreign Affairs Problem
Problem

Total
1
7
7
4
1
10
4
6

Communism
Africa
Mid East/Oil
Arms Control
Peace/Morality
Foreign Affairs, General
Panama Canal
Other

T A B L E

2.8
19 .4
19 .4
11.1
2.8
27-8
11.1
16.7

2 1

Major Foreign Affairs Problem - First Choic
Problem

To tal

Peace in the Mid East
Relations with USSR
Human Rights
Panama Canal Treaty
Majority Rule in Africa
Not Sure

T A B L E

32
15
22
16
8
2

>
33-7
15.8
23.2
16.8
8.4
2.1

2 2

Major Foreign Affairs Problem - Second Choic
Problem
Peace in the Mid East
Relations with USSR
Human Rights
Panama Canal Treaty
Majority Rule in Africa
Not Sure

Total

%

22
25
6
20
12
8

23.7
26.9
6.5
21.5
12 .9
8.6

*The total is greater than 100# because Panama is included
in the Foreign Affairs, General category.
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T A B L E

23

Should Treaty Be Ratified
Response

Total

Agree
Disagree
Hot Sure

34
30
31

T A B L E

°/o
35.8
31.6
32.6

24

Should Panama Have Greater Control
Response
Favor
Oppose
Not Sure

cf
f°

To tal

36.2
43.6
20.2

34
41
19

T A B L E

25

Would Panamanian Control Affect the U. S
Response

Total

Yes
No
Not Sure

56
27
12

T A B

L E

58.9
28.4
12.6

2 6

. Panamanian Control Affect
Response
Trade
Defense
U. S. Rights
Other

To tal
13
12
10
12

°k
27.7
2 5 »5
21.3
25-5

64

T A B L E

27

Is the Canal Necessary for Defense
Response

Total

Agree
Disagree
Not Sure

51
34
9

%
54.3
36.2
9.6

T A B L E
2 8
the Canal is Necessary or not Necessary
Response

Total
4
13
14
14
4

Trade
Defense, General
Not Necessary - Defense
Necessary - Unspecified
Other

T A B L E

%
8.2
26.5
28.6
28.6
8.2

2 9

Should Troops be used to control Canal
Response
Yes
No
Not Sure

Total

_

..

%

32.6
48 .4
18.9

31
46
18

3 0

T A B L E

President Responsible for Treaty
Response
Roosevelt
Wrong

Total
5°
44

%
53*2
46.8

T A B L E

3 1

Status of the Canal
Response

Total

Owns
Leases
Not Sure

19
58
18

T A B L E

%
20.0
61.1
18.9

3 2

What is Remembered About Canal

%

Total

Response
Engineering Feat
Treaty
Disease
Trade/East-West Passage
Other

T A B L E

29
4
22
10
5

41.4
5.7
31.4
14,3
7-1

3 3

Most Influential Person
Response

Total

Carter
Other (Ford, Reagan, etc. )

23
58

T A B L E

%
28.4
71-6

3 4

Source of Information
Response
Press
Magazines
Television
Other

Total
45
7
25
15

%
48.9
7.6
27.2
16.3
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As may be seen in Table 22, subjects, when asked for
the second most important issue, responded, in descending
order, the Soviet Union, Middle East, Panama Canal, South
Africa and human rights.

Those mentioning Panama rose from

6 per cent in the first survey to 21.5 per cent in the second
survey.
The results of the second section of the questionnaire
are shown in Table 23. and 31*8 per cent of those questioned
believed that the Panama Canal treaties should not be
ratified by the Senate.

In the first survey almost one-half

of those questioned were not sure how they felt about the
treaties.
survey.

That number decreased to one-third in the second

Subjects that moved out of the ’’Not sure" column

moved into the ranks of those who disapproved of the treaties
as that percentage went from 14.4 per cent to 31*8 percent.
The percentage approving of the treaties remained relatively
stable at 35*8 per cent.
When the question specifically mentioned that the
treaties were designed to give Panama greater control over
the canal, the percentage disapproving moved from 35*2 in
the first survey to 43*6 in the second.

However, the percentage

approving of such treaties also increased from 28 to 35*8.
The percentage of respondents who were not sure whether
Panama should be given greater control decreased from 37 to
20, suggesting that the subjects had done some thinking about
the canal treaties in the interim.
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It is interesting to note that, when asked to assess
the strength of their opinions about giving Panama greater
control of the canal, those who opposed held much stronger
opinions than those who agreed.

Of the respondents reporting

that they felt very strongly about the issue, 64 per cent
were opposed to the treaties.

Of those who did not feel very

strongly about the issue, six out of ten were in favor of the
treaties.

However, these differences did not reach statistical

significance.
The respondents were then asked how Panamanian control
of the canal would affect the United States and a total of
55*6 per cent responded that trade or defense would be
influenced as seen in Table 26.

Other respondents were

concerned with United States rights in the Canal Zone or
Panama's ability to handle the responsibility and keep the
canal open.
In the next question, a statement was read:

"American

control of the canal is necessary for the defense of the United
States."

Subjects were then asked if they agreed or disagreed.

There was little change in the percentage of responses to
this question.

Of those responding, 54.3 Per cent agreed

while 36.2 per cent disagreed and one in ten was unsure.
These findings are in Table 27 .

However, when questioned

more specifically about why they answered they way they did,
a much larger percentage (28.6 per cent as compared to 7,8
per cent on the first survey) were not able to specify why
they thought it was necessary, but gave generally "unspecified"
reasons for defending the canal.
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Table 29 shows that 32.6 per cent of the subjects would
use troops to defend the canal while 48.4 per cent said they
would not.

For this question, the biggest shift from the

first survey was in the percentage who were not sure of how
they felt; there was a decrease from 3 i •3 per cent to 18.7
per cent in this category.
The third section of the survey was again the general
section designed to see how much factual knowledge the
subjects had about Panama,

When asked to identify the

president responsible for negotiating the original Panama
Canal treaty, over half of the respondents correctly identified
Theodore Roosevelt.

This indicated a major change from the

first survey when only 38 per cent could give the correct
response.

Six out of ten of the subjects said the United

States leases the canal rather than owns it.

Less than half

had answered the survey item correctly the first time.
In the last question in this section, the respondents
were asked what they remembered most about the canal from
studying it in school.

The results are in Table 32.

The

major change from the first survey is the number of subjects
who most remember the engineering feat and combating disease.
Two additional questions were added to this survey
to determine major sources of influence on the subjects.
When asked to name the public or private person who most
influenced their views, the president was the person most
frequently cited, but only 28.4 per cent of the respondents
said that he had the most influence on their views regarding
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the Panama Canal.

The remaining 7 1 .6 per cent named various

other public figures such as Ford, Kissinger, or Reagan, or
said no one influenced their views.
When asked about sources of information, almost onehalf of the respondents received their information from the
press while one-fourth depended on the television for
information.

The responses to this question are in Table 34.

As in the first survey,

in order to determine whether

there were any differences among the various sub-groups as
to the significant problems, total frequencies were
subdivided for each category of sub-group.

The resulting

contingency tables were tested for significance using chi
square.
In this survey the responses to the question asking
about the second most important foreign affairs problem
facing the United States were again related significantly
(p<.01) with age.

As in Survey I, the younger respondents

were more concerned with foreign affairs, generally.

No

other variable was related to age in the second survey.
Educational level in this survey was related to answers
to the question concerned with the most important problem
facing the United States today.

Concern over foreign affairs

was greatest (p<.01) among those who had some high school
education, and among those who had completed college.

Of

those who had completed college, 45*5 per cent were concerned
about economic conditions, while concern about unemployment
was most salient for those who had completed high school.
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When asked specifically about the most important foreign
affairs problem, there was, as in Survey I, a significant
(p<.0 5 ) relationship between the choice of a problem and
education.

Concern about foreign affairs generally was

decidedly higher among those who had completed high school.
Those with some college and post graduates were concerned
about the Middle East and oil, while those who had completed
college were more likely to be concerned with arms control.
Those with some high school were worried about communism.
The level of education also related significantly (p<.01)
to the question of treaty approval, as it did in the first
survey.

The largest percentage of those opposed to the

treaty had completed high school or had some college education.
Among those favoring the treaty, 44.1 per cent had completed
college and 26.5 per cent had done post graduate work.

The

respondents with only a grade shcool education were more
likely to be unsure of how they felt about the treaties.
When asked specifically if Panamanian control of the
canal would affect the United States, there was a significant
(p<.01) relationship between the responses and education.
Interestingly, both the number of "yes” and "no" responses
increased with education.

The respondents that answered

"don't know" to this question were less well educated.

Over

60 per cent of the respondents with a grade school education
were not able to be definitive with this question.
The next question asked if the respondent felt that the
canal was necessary for defense of the United States.

As in

71
Survey I, the

greater the education (p<.01) the less likely

the respondent was to see
States defense.

the canal as necessary for United

Among the respondents who had completed

college, 54.2 per cent did not see the canal as essential.
For post graduates this figure rose to 60 per cent.

In

contrast, 100

per cent of the respondents with grade school

education and

5° per cent with somehigh school education and

65 per cent of those who had completed high school, felt that
the canal was necessary for the defense of the United States .
Not surprisingly, there was, again, a significant
relationship (p<. 01) between education and identification
of the president who negotiated the original Panama Canal
treaty.

The higher the education, the more likely the

respondent was to know the correct answer.
Military experience was again a factor in choosing
the most important problem facing the United States

(p^-.Ol).

Among those respondents who had military experience, concern
for the economy and morality were down considerably while
interest in foreign affairs and energy was up.

The respondents

whose spouse or father had military experience also showed
increased concern about foreign affairs.

Among respondents

with no military past, the economy was the major problem
listed.
The religion of the respondent continued to relate
significantly (pc.Ol) to his willingness to have the treaties
ratified by the Senate.

Catholic subjects were much more

likely to have the treaties ratified than Protestants with
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72.7 per cent of the Catholics approving of ratification.
Of those opposed to the treaties, seven out of ten were
Protestant.
The next question asked whether the respondent thought
Panama should receive greater control over the canal, and,
as in Survey I, responses varied (p<.01) with religion.
Generally, Protestants opposed and Catholics favored such
control.

Among Catholic subjects, approximately eight out

of ten favored giving Panama greater control while 5 6 .? P©**
cent of the Protestant respondents were opposed to such a
move .
There were also religious differences seen in responses
to the question of the effect of Panamanian control on the
United States.

Approximately 64 per cent of the Protestants

responding thought that Panamanian control would hurt the
United States.

Catholics were split, with 45*5 per cent

believing that it would affect the United States and 45-5
per cent that it would not.

It is important to note that

among those with "other” religions, eight out of ten felt
that it would not affect the United St a t e s .

Eight out of

ten Catholics felt that the canal was not essential to the
defense of the United States while 68 per cent of Protestants
took the opposite position (p<c.01).
The answers to the question about defense were also
related (p<r.05) to the income of the respondent.

Those with

a lower income were more likely to believe the canal is
essential for defense.

73

As in Survey I, there were sex differences in answers to the
question asking for the second most important problem facing
the United States today (pc.Ol).

There was a big increase

in concern about foreign affairs among m a l e s .

Of those who

responded to this question with a foreign affairs issue,
75 per cent were male.

Among males, foreign affairs was

listed more frequently than any other category of response.
There was a big increase among females in concern about
unemployment and various other uncategorized problems.
Women were generally more concerned with the economy than
were men.
The sex of the subject continued to relate significantly
(p<v01) to responses to the question about treaty ratification.
Males were more likely to approve than females while the
largest percentage of females remained unsure of how they
felt.

However, the percentage of females who were unsure

was significantly lower than in the first survey.
males and females,

Among both

those agreeing with treaty approval

remained fairly stable while the percentage who were unsure
decreased and the percentage that opposed ratification
increased from 14.6 per cent to 31*6 per cent.

Females also

continued to oppose giving Panama more control over the canal
compared to men (p<.0 5 ).
The second survey attempted to assess the sources of
influence on the respondents' views concerning the canal
treaties.

There was a significant (p<.05) relationship

between the willingness to have the treaties approved and
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the person identified as having the greatest influence on the
subjects' opinion.

Of those that disapproved of the treaties,

only 16.7 per cent said that President Carter had most
influenced their views while 75 per cent gave varied other
responses from "no one" to Ronald Reagan.

Among those who

were most influenced by the President, seven out of ten
favored treaty ratification.
When asked in what way they felt the United States
would be affected by Panamanian control, there was a signi
ficant (p<.0 5 ) relationship between responses and the person
identified as being most influential on the subjects' views.
In general, those who did not mention President Carter as
most influencing their views were concerned with the adverse
effect of Panamanian control on trade and. defense.

Those

who did mention the president as influencing their views
were more concerned with other issues, such as United States
rights in the Canal Zone.

Over 90 per cent of those who did

not mention President Carter as being an influence, mentioned
trade and defense as areas to be affected by Panamanian
control.
The question about defense also related significantly
(p<*0 5 ) to the person most influencing the respondents’ views.
Those subjects who were most influenced by President Carter
were more likely to believe that the canal is not necessary
for United States defense, while those respondents with other
sources of influence were more likely to believe that the
canal was necessary for United States defense.
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The identification of the president responsible for
the first canal treaty also related significantly (p<. 01)
with the respondents' source of information.

Those who read

the papers and magazines were more likly to correctly
identify Roosevelt than those who received their information
from television or other sources.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The hypothesis of this paper was that although the
American public is generally apathetic to or, at most tolerant
of, foreign affairs in most instances, the Panama Canal treaty
issue is salient to the American people.

Public opinion on

the Panama Canal treaties is stronger than is typical on
foreign policy issues.

This salience is due not only to a

belief that control of the canal is vital to the interest and
defense of the United States but also to the belief that the
canal represents a great technological accomplishment and an
investment of American capital and skill.
hypothesized that for Americans,

It was further

"bread and butter" issues,

such as the possible interruption of trade between the east
and west coasts with resulting higher prices, make this an
important issue.
The results of the first survey indicated that, at the
time it was taken, foreign affairs generally and the Panama
Canal specifically were not the major concern of the subjects,
especially when compared to such bread and butter issues as
energy and unemployment.

By the time of the second survey

the Panama Canal treaties had been renegotiated, signed by
the president, and sent to the Senate for ratification.
There was an increased concern about foreign affairs generally
76
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at this time and especially about the Panama Canal, presumably
as a result of these political developments .

Even then the

proportion of the interviewees concerned about Panama was
well below one-half, a figure well in line with the usual
finding that Americans have little interest in foreign affairs.
Ronald Reagan's ability to utilize this issue in his campaign
must be explained by reasons other than its ingrained
importance to the general public. ' Moreover, the intense
Congressional opposition to renegotiation and ratification
of the Panama Canal treaties may simply be another example of
congressmen misreading the opinions of their constituents.
As it turned out, this opposition represented minority opinion
even within the Congress.
It may still be instructive, however, to examine the
bases of concern about the treaties among subjects when they
are pushed to consider ratification and the importance of
the canal to the United States.

The

majority of the subjects

in both surveys indicated that defense and trade, a bread and
butter issue, were major areas of concern.

An additional 25

per cent gave answers having vaguely to do with our rights
of access to the canal, and only 20 per cent of those surveyed
cited such reasons as the

importance of the jobs

of people

working in the Canal Zone

or that Panama was unable to run the

canal efficiently.
Since such a large number of respondents believed that
the canal is important for defense and trade, it
surprising that the issue

is not

of control looms large in attitudes
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toward renegotiation of the treaties.

When asked in the

first survey if they approved of renegotiating the treaties,
a much larger percentage approved than disapproved (36 per
cent to 14 per cent) although almost one-half had no opinion.
However, when the respondents were reminded that the treaties
would give greater control

to Panama,

disapproval rose to almost

35 while approval dropped to

about 28 per cent.

the percentage of

This clearly indicates that while these

subjects were willing to negotiate a new treaty, they were
unwilling to give greater control to Panama.

In the second

survey, the largest percentage (3 5 *8 ) remained in approval
of ratification of the treaties although about 32 per cent
disapproved and another 32 per cent remained unsure of their
feelings.

Again, when reminded that the treaties would give

greater control to Panama, the disapproval rate increased to
44 per cent while those who were unsure dropped to 20 per
c e nt .
The issue of control

is a critical one because it is

closely associated with both defense and trade which are
major concerns expressed by the subjects.

It has also been

the crucial issue in many of the other public opinion surveys
taken on the Panama Canal.

William Schneider of Harvard has

observed that:
A look at all the questions asked over the
past year reveals that "control" of the canal
has long been the key issue to the American
public.
Any question which specifies that the
United States will hand over control of the
canal of Panama elicits a strongly negative
public reaction--unless the meaning of
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"control" is further qualified.
In this survey and in others, the American people have
generally been reluctant to give blanket control to Panama.
The present survey did not have a follow-up question
qualifying the control, but polls by CBS and The New York
Times in October, 1977* and NBC in January, 1978 did.

In

both of these surveys, respondents were asked if they would
approve giving Panama greater control,

if the United States

were guaranteed the right to defend the canal.

In both

cases, the qualifying statement received the approval of a
majority of the subjects and reversed previous findings.
This seems to indicate that Americans are concerned primarily
with defense of the canal and the assurance of its continued,
uninterrupted usage, not with ownership per se or even who
runs the canal.

Indeed, when asked how they perceived that

Panamanian control would affect the United States, subjects
in both surveys in this study most frequently said that trade
would be affected.

The next most frequent response was that

American defense and general rights would be affected.
This discrepancy between willingness to renegotiate
a treaty and an unwillingness to relinquish control reflects
the complexity of this whole issue and may go far in
explaining the differences in opinions among the various

-^William Schneider, "Behind the Passions of the Canal
Debate," The Washington Post. February 12, 1978, p. Cl.
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sub-groups studied.

The present survey and most of the others

taken show that approval of the treaties increases markedly
with the educational level of the respondents.
educated tend to have a broader world-view,

"The well-

to understand

more complex and remote causes, to give more support to policies
39
that involve no immediate, palpable benefits."^

In addition,

they are more likely to understand the terms of the proposed
treaties that would give the United States defense rights.
All education levels expressed concern for trade and defense,
but the more highly educated subjects in both surveys approved
of the treaties, obviously believing that the interests of
the United States could be protected under them.
One of the surprising results of the present survey was
the religious differences that continually appeared.
Basically, Protestants were opposed to the treaties, while
Catholics overwhelmingly approved.

Various explanations

were considered, including the close ties between the Catholic
church in North America and Latin America.

The survey

results were rechecked to determine if there were any other
systematic differences confounded with religion.

It was

discovered that the Catholics in this survey had an abnormally
high level of education.

Of the Catholics questioned in the

second survey, 18 per cent were high school graduates, 55
per cent were college graduates, and 27 per cent were

-^Ibid ., p . C8.
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post graduates.
The most obvious explanation, then, for religious
differences is not religion, but education.

The respondents

with a higher level of education support the treaties and
are willing to give Panama greater control over the canal
than those with lower levels of education.

Differences in

opinion between men and women can also be explained, at
least partially, by differences in the levels of education,
since the male subjects tended to have a higher educational
level than females.
The control issue does not explain all the opposition
to the treaties.

"The most compelling reason given by

Americans for opposing the treaties is that the canal is
purs."

Zj,o

There is a great deal of pride of ownership

connected with the canal.

It represents American success

where others have failed and some feel that it was an act
of kindness for the United States to build the canal in the
first place.
We built it in a humanitarian way, by first
wiping out the disease and suffering that had
impeded other canal projects.
We gave independence
to the Panamanian people . . ., and we created an
unnatural resource which has brought great material
benefit to Panama.
Americans regard the Panama
Canal as a monument to our technological know-how
and to our humanitarian instincts, as a symbol of
yankee ingenuity, not yankee imperialism.^

41

Ibid.
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In the present study, the subjects,

in response to the

question about what they remembered studying about the canal,
most frequently cited the enginerring accomplishment (41.4
per cent) and secondly the conquering of disease (3 1 *^ per
cent) in the jungles of Panama.

Others remembered the

tremendous boost to world trade that can be attributed to
the canal.

These responses clearly indicate that the

subjects do see the building of the canal as a major
American accomplishment and feel pride in this achievement.
The results of these two surveys, then, show that
American concern centers around the problem of controls.
The major difference among sub-groups seems to be explained
by the fact that people with higher levels of education tend
to approve of the treaties more, although they still express
concern about defense and trade.

Religious and sex differences

in this study may also be explained by educational differences.
One point that should not be overlooked is the role of
the president in influencing public opinion.

As Mueller

pointed out, the public tends to look to political leaders
for cues for opinions.

"Many in the population grope for

cues on which to base their opinion.

The perceived issue

position of various opinion leaders is often taken as an
42
important g u i de."

42

Mueller, Op. cit., p. 69*
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This tendency to look to the president for cues is
apparent in the number of responses to questions about the
most important problems facing the United States today.

The

first survey was taken at a time when President Carter was
taking a stand for human rights throughout the world.

When

asked to choose the most important foreign policy issues from
a list, the largest percentage (3*0 of respondents chose
"human rights throughout the world" and only 2.1 per cent
chose the Panama Canal treaty negotiations.

In addition,

there were a large number of volunteered responses about
human rights and morality when subjects were asked to name
the most Important general problem facing the United States.
In the second survey the results were quite different.
Presidential attention had shifted from the general question
of human rights to more specific problem areas such as Panama
and the Middle East.

Consequently, the number of people

volunteering responses about human rights decreased and replies
about the Panama Canal increased significantly.

When asked

to choose the most important problem, the Middle East was
mentioned most frequently and the percentage placing Panama
in the first position rose to 17.2 per cent.

Those mentioning

human rights decreased to 23 per cent.
These findings strongly suggest that the president is
a focal point for opinion formation in the United States
and leads a number of people to follow and support his position.
This confirms the positions of Mueller, Rosi, and Sears.
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In the second survey, when subjects were asked to
identify the person who had most influenced their views,
those who named the president as a major source of influence
overwhelmingly supported the ratification of the treaties
and believed that they would have no significant adverse
effect on the United States.

On the other hand, those who

said they were most influenced by someone other than the
president (Reagan, Congress, Ford) generally did not support
the views of the president.

It should be pointed out, however,

that only 28 per cent of those responding to this question
named the president as the major source of influence while
72 per cent named other sources.

This might indicate that

although the president has been able to focus the attention
of the public on issues

(first human rights, then the Middle

East and Panama) he has been less successful in persuading
a large segment to accept his position on the Panama Canal
treaties.
It may have been that the president's recognition of
this led to the massive campaign begun by the president and
the State Department in the fall, after the signing ceremonies,
to convince the public to support the treaties.

The major

theme of this campaign was that although control (i.e.,
operation) of the canal would be turned over to Panama, the
United States' interests would be protected because the right
to defend the canal and priority usage of the canal in
emergencies would be retained.

It was only after amendments

had been added to the treaties guaranteeing these things that
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they were ratified by the Senate.
A recent Harris poll found that
although Americans now favor the two treaties by
a narrow margin, they still are quite reluctant
about handing over the canal.
It was only the
addition of the two key amendments dealing with
the emergency rights for United States forces
and warships . . . that tipped the public favor
of the second t r e a t y . ^
With these amendments the public now supports the
treaties 49 per cent to 41 per cent.

The people are

willing to have a new treaty, but unwilling to jeopardize
American usage and defense of the canal.

With these

guarantees, the treaties became clearly more acceptable to
the Senate and the public.
This question of the intricate relationship between
the formulation of policy and the public opinion is an
interesting one worthy of further study.
has observed that " . . .

Bernard C. Cohen

the literature of political science

and history has veiled the crucial coupling of public opinion
44
and foreign policy."
Studies have been made to determine
what the public opinion might be on a particular foreign
policy issue, but just how and if the opinion affects the
final policy of the government has remained illusive.

The

argument was made in the first chapter that presidents have

43
^"Narrow Margin in U . S. Prefers Panama Canal Treaty
Approval," The Washington Post, April 13» 1978, p. A 9 •.
44
Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign
Policy,(Boston; .Little, Brown and Company, 1973)* P* 26.

86
been unable to conclude treaty negotiations with Panama
because of strong public opinion.
General Torrijos frequently claimed that there were
limits to treaty provisions that he could accept because of
Panamanian public opinion.

Ellsworth Bunker stated early in

the negotiation process that the American public would have
to be reeducated to accept the new treaties.

These statements

bring to mind several questions that remain unanswered by
this study and suggest the focus for future studies.

First,

why were the treaties concluded by the State Department and
the president in the midst of adverse public opinion?

At

what point in the policy formulation was the opinion of the
public taken into account?

Were there any portions of the

treaties that clearly reflect public opinion rather than
the opinions of the policy-makers themselves?

The data

necessary to answer these questions would obviously have to
be drawn from the State Department files on treaty negotiation.
Although we cannot answer specific questions about
how the public opinion influences the formulation of policy,
what is indicated in this study is that the public attention
can be directed to foreign affairs.

Moreover, there is

evidence that leaders such as the president can direct this
attention and can influence the direction that attention will
take, especially among the better educated public.

It seems

likely that the best explanation of Reagan's ability to use
the Panama Canal treaties as a campaign issue was this ability
of a leader to focus the public's attention.

The fact that

8?
he was able to make the treaties an issue was not because
Panama was already a salient issue, but rather because he
was effective in making it stand out for the public and to
generate adverse opinion.
People generally are more concerned with personal bread
and butter issues, but if a foreign affairs issue can be
made a bread and butter issue by opinion leaders,

it becomes

more important, at least temporarily, to the American public.
It must be concluded that there is very little evidence
to demonstrate that the Panama Canal treaties constitute an
exception to the usual public opinion-foreign policy
relationship, despite Reagan's effectiveness with the Texas
voters.

APPENDIX A
Public Opinion Survey
Panana Canal
Survey I
Phone number:________
Name

of interviewer:

Status:

Completed ( )
Partial Interview ( )
Refusal ( )
No Answer ( )

ID Code:________________
*

•* * ■*■*#■){■■*

-fr-fr-H- • * * - *

-M- ■ * * ■ * * * • -3fr • * * • « - -M- * ■ * •«- * •

* * * * *

■ * - * -B- -B- -M-

* •* * *

-M-

Hello, I am __________________ and I am taking a public opinion
survey for the Government Department at Williams and Mary.
1 would like to ask you some questions about issues facing
the United States today.
Are you 18 years of age or older:
1.
Yes ( )
2. No ( )
GO TO QUESTION 2
Is there anyone 18 or older at
home that I could speak with?
1. Yes ( )
WHEN THE PERSON
ANSWERS, REPEAT THE
INTRODUCTION AND GO
TO QUESTION 2.
2.

2. No ( )
END INTERVIEW

What do you consider to be your home state?

SECTION I
3. What do you see as the two most important problem facing
the United States today?
IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT MENTION A SECOND PROBLEM:
Is there any other problem that you think is important?
4. What about in the area of foreign affairs, what do you
see as the most important problem facing the United Stat es
today?
4a.
Is there any other foreign affairs problem that you
think is important?

5*
I am going to list some current problems and I would like
for you to tell me which you consider to be the most pressing
problem in this list:
1.
2.
34.
5.
8.
6.

peace in the Middle East ( )
relations with the Soviet Union ( )
human rights throughout the world
( )
Panama Canal treaty negotiations ( )
majority rule in South Africa ( )
not sure ( )

Which do you think is the second most pressing problem?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
8.

peace in the Middle East ( )
relations with the Soviet Union ( )
human rights throughout the world
( )
Panama Canal treaty negotiations ( )
majority rule in South Africa ( )
not sure ( )

SECTION II
7 . You have probably heard something about the negotiations
between the United States and Panama over the new Panama Canal
treaty.
Do you agree that a new treaty should be negotiated,
disagree, or haven't you formed an opinion yet?
1.

agree ( )

2.

oppose ( )

8.

no opinion ( )

7a. One proposal would give Panama greater control over the
canal.
Would you favor or oppose such a treaty or haven't
you formed an opinion about this?
1.

favor ( )

2.

oppose ( )

8 . no opinion ( )
GO TO QUESTION 9

8 . How strongly do you (favor) (oppose) giving Panama
greater control over the canal -- very strongly, strongly,
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?
1 . very strongly ( )
3*

not very strongly (

2.
) 4.

strongly ( )
not strongly at all ( )

9 . Do you feel that if Panama were given greater control over
the canal it would have any effect on the United States
directly?
1.
yes ( )
2.
no ( )
8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 9a.GO TO QUESTION 10. GO TO QUESTION 10.
9a.

In

what way do you think it would affect the United States
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10.
I am going to read you a statement and I want you to
tell me if you agree or disagree:
"American control of the canal is necessary for the
defense of the United States."
Do you agree or disagree?
1.

agree ( )

2 . disagree

( )

8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 13.

11. How strongly would you say you (agree)(disagree)-very strongly, strongly, not very strongly, or not strongly
at all?

12.

1.

very strongly ( )

2 .strongly ( )

3.

Not very strongly ( ) 4. not strongly at all

( )

Why do you feel that way?

13* Would you.favor using United States troops to keep
control of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion
about this yet?
1.

yes

( )

2.

no ( )8 .

no opinion ( )

SECTION III
14. Do you happen to remember the name of the United States
president who was responsible for negotiating the original
Panama Canal treaty?
1.

correct (T. Roosevelt)

3•

d o n 't know ( )

( )

2. incorrect ( )

15* The present status of the canal is rather unclear.
Do
you happen to remember whether the United States owns or
leases the canal or aren't you sure?
1.

owns ( )

2 . leases

( )

8 . not sure ( )

16.
Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal
in school.
What sticks in your mind most about the canal?
SECTION IV
17. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about
yourself.
What is the year of your birth?
18.

How many years of formal schooling did you complete?
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1.
2.
3*
5*
6.
7.
19*

some grade school ( )
completed 8th grade ( )
some high school ( )
completed high school ( )
some college ( )
graduated college ( )
post graduate ( )

In what state did you go to elementary school?

20.
Are you or anyone in your family associated with the
military now?
l
c'oT-pr'i
r. s e n ^ j
2. spouse ( )
3 . son ( )
4. father ( )
5. other ( ) _________
GO TO QUESTION 21

^ * no ( )
G0 TO QUESTION 2.0a

20a.
Have you or anyone in your family ever served in the
military?
1.
2.
3.
b.
c.

self ( )
spouse ( )
son ( )
father ( )
n t h p r

(

6.
GO

no ( )
TO- QUESTION 21

)

GO TO QUESTION 20b.
20b.

When was that?

21.
What is your religious preference -- Protestant, Roman
Catholic, Jewish or none of these?
1.

Protestant ( )

2.

Catholic ( )

Other ( )

5*

None ( )

3.

Jewish ( )

22. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
1. Democrat ( )
SKIP TO 22b.
8. Not sure (
SKIP TO 23.

2. Republican ( )
SKIP to 22b.
22a.

22b.
Would you call yourself
a strong (Republican) (Democrat)
or not very strong (Republican)
(Democrat)?
1. strong ( )
2. not very strong ( )
8. not sure ( )

3 . Independent ( )
Skip to 22a.

Do you think of yourself
as closer to the Republican
or Democratic party?
1. Democrat ( )
2. Republican ( )
3* neither ( )
8. not sure ( )
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2 3 * Do you consider yourself to be a member of any racial
minority group?
1*

yes ( ) 2 .

no

( )

8.

not sure ( )

2*K For the purposes of our research,
would you give me an
estimate of your family's gross income this year --under
$10,000; $10,000 - $20,000; $20,000 - $ 3 0 ,000; over $ 3 0 ,000?
1.

under $10,000 ( )

2.

3 . $20,000 - $ 3 0 ,000 ( ) 4.

$10,000 - $20,000
over

$30,000 ()

8 . not sure ( )
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP WITH OUR SURVEY.
1.

male ( )

2.

female

( )

( )

APPENDIX B
Public Opinion Survey
Panama Canal
Survey II
Phone number _______
Name of interviewer:
Status:

Completed ( )
Partial Interview ( )
Refusal ( )
No Answer ( )
The correct respondent not available ( )

Sex of the respondent wanted:

Male ( )

Female ( )

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

A. Hello, I am ________________________and I am taking a pubic
opinion survey for the Government Department at William and
Mary.
I called this number last March to ask some questions
about issues facing the United States today.
(GO TO B or C
AS APPROPRIATE)
B.
(IF THE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME SEX AS ABOVE):
the person I talked to at that
time?
Yes

( ) (GO TO D)

No

() (GO TO C)

Are you

C.
(IF THE RESPONDENT IS A. DIFFERENT SEX FROM THE ABOVE):
Is the person that I talked with there?
Yes ( )
No

(WHEN THE PERSON COMES TO THE PHONE, READ THE
OPENING SENTENCE AGAIN AND THEN GO TO D)

() (TRY TO DETERMINE WHEN THAT PERSON COULD BE
REACHED AND THEN CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW)
Thank you very much for your time.

D.
I would like to ask you a few follow-up questions about
issues facing the United States today?
SECTION I
1. What do you see as the two most important problems facing
the United States today?
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IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT MENTION A SECOND PROBLEM:
la.

Is there any other problem that you think is important?

2. What about in the area of foreign affairs, what do you see
as the most important problem facing the United States today?
2a.
Is there any other foreign affairs problem that you think
is important?
3 . I am going to.list some current problems and I would like
for you to tell me which you consider to be the most pressing
problem in this list:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5«
8.
4.

peace in the Middle East ( )
relations with the Soviet Union ( )
human rights throughout the world ( )
Panama Canal treaty approval ( )
majority rule in South Africa ( )
not sure ( )

Which do you think is the second most pressing problem?
1.
2.
3*
4.
5.
8.

peace in the Miiddle East ( )
relations with the Soviet Union ( )
human rights throughout the world ( )
Panama Canal treaty approval ( )
majority rule in South Africa ( )
not sure ( )

SECTION II
5* You have probably heard something about the proposed
treaties between the United States and Panama. Do you agree
that the new treaties should be approved, disagree, or
haven't you formed an opinion yet?
1.

agree ( )

2.

disagree (

)

8.

no opinion ( )

5a.
The treaties would give Panama greater control over the
canal. Do you favor or oppose such treaties or haven't you
formed an opinion about this?
1.

favor ( )

2.

oppose ( )

3* no opinion ( )
GO TO QUESTION 7

6.. How strongly do you (favor) (oppose) giving Panama
greater control over the canal
very strongly, strongly,
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?
1.

very strongly ( )

2.

3*

not very strongly ( )

strongly
4.

( )

not strongly at all ( )
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7. Do you feel that if Panama were given greater control
over the canal it would have any effect on the United States
directly?
1 . yes ( )
2 . no ( )
GO TO QUESTION 7aGO TO QUESTION

8

8.
not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 8

7a.
In what way do you think it would affect the United
States?
8.
I am going to read you a statement andI want you to
me if you agree or disagree:

tell

"American control of the canal is necessary for the
defense of the United States."
Do you agree or disagree?
1.

agree ( )

2.

disagree ( )

8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 11

How strongly would you say you (agree)(disagree) -very strongly, strongly, not very strongly, or not strongly
at all?

10.

1.

very strongly ( )

2.

3*

not very strongly ( ) 4.

strongly ( )
not strongly at all ( )

Why do you feel that way?

11. Would you favor using United States troops to keep
control of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion
about this yet?
1*

yes ( )

2.

no

(

)

8 . no opinion (

)

SECTION III
12. Do you happen to remember the name of the United States
president who was responsible for negotiating the original
Panama Canal treaty?
1.

correct (T. Roosevelt)( )

8.

d o n 't know ( )

2.

incorrect (

)

13*
The present status of the canal is rather unclear.
Do you happen to remember whether the United States owns or
leases the canal or aren't you sure?
1 . owns ( )

2 . leases

( )

8 . not sure ( )
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1A. Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal
in school.
What sticks in your mind most about the canal?
SECTION IV
15* Now, thinking about what should be done about the canal
today, what public official or private individual would you
say has most influenced your views about the treaties?
16. From what source have you received most of your
information about the Panama Canal in recent months?
Thank you very much for your help with our survey.
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